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SURVEY SECTION
Legal Malpractice. Richmond Square Capital Corp. v. Mittle-
man, 773 A.2d 882 (R.I. 2001). An attorney and his law firm com-
mitted legal malpractice by failing to notify lender about unpaid-
tax encumbrances on mortgaged property used to secure a loan,
and this subsequently damaged the lender because it was forced to
pay back-taxes in order to maintain its collateral and priority as a
first position lender. Furthermore, any evidence of a settlement
between the lender and a guarantor over the loan default was
inadmissible to disprove damages regarding the legal malpractice
claim.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Richard Mittleman (Mittleman or defendants) and the law
firm of Cameron and Mittleman (defendants) appealed from a
damages judgment after a jury found them liable to their client,
lender Richmond Square Capital Corporation (Richmond Square
or plaintiffs), for legal malpractice.' The plaintiffs retained the de-
fendants for representation in connection with a loan to be made to
Parking Corporation of America (Parking), and to be secured by
mortgages on several pieces of real estate including the Shepard
Building.2 The alleged malpractice occurred when Mittleman as-
sured the president of Richmond Square, Harold Schein (Schein),
that Richmond Square would have a first position mortgage on the
Shepard Building property.3 At this point Schein believed that the
Shepard Building was free and clear of all encumbrances because
he would not have made the loan if he knew there were outstand-
ing taxes due and owing on the property.4 As a small business in-
vestment corporation, Richmond Square had certain lending limits
which were exceeded by adding the amount of unpaid taxes to the
loan extended to Parking.5
Shortly after the property's closing, Parking failed to make re-
quired loan payments, and in December 1990, the plaintiffs re-
ceived notice of a tax sale on the Shepard building.6 "Schein
1. See Richmond Square Capital Corp. v. Mittleman, 773 A.2d 882, 883 (R.I.
2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 884.
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testified that he was shocked to receive such notice because he
thought all the taxes [had been] paid by the previous owner."7 To
avoid public auction, Richmond Square paid the 1989 back-taxes
and in February 1991 instituted a foreclosure on the Shepard
building property, subsequently selling it.8 During the foreclosure
proceedings, Richmond Square entered into a settlement with
David Golden (Golden), the president of Parking, concerning the
loan guaranty. 9 In exchange for releasing Golden from his guar-
anty, he agreed not to contest the foreclosure, gave Richmond
Square several properties, and paid $40,000.10
On December 17, 1993, Richmond Square filed a legal mal-
practice action.1 Initially, the action was dismissed pursuant to
the statute of limitations, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that there was a question of material fact as to
when Richmond Square discovered the tax liens.12 If the plaintiffs
did not discover the validity of the tax liens until on or after De-
cember 17, 1990, their claim was timely.' 3 The jury found that
Richmond Square did not learn of the tax liens until December 17,
1990 at the earliest and, therefore, rendered a verdict of
$127,182.16 in its favor. 14
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the defendants contended that Richmond Square
failed to prove its actual damages. 15 The defendants also asserted
that the trial justice erred in excluding evidence concerning the
settlement between Richmond Square and Golden that, if admit-
ted, would have reduced or negated Richmond Square's damages
arising from the legal malpractice. 16 The defendants argued that
the settlement documents would have helped the jury analyze the
value of the consideration given by Golden to determine if this
amount was more or less than Golden's initial obligations under
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 885.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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the loan.17 Ultimately, the defendants asserted that without these
documents in evidence the jury was not in a position to determine
whether Richmond Square suffered any damages.' 8 In addition,
defendants argued that Richmond Square was reimbursed for any
damages through the settlement agreement with Golden, and that,
in spite of the back-taxes payment and the expenses of foreclosure,
Richmond Square profited from the settlement. 19
The plaintiffs asserted that the settlement documents were ir-
relevant because they were speculative, did not have probative
value, and were too far removed from the loan transaction at is-
sue. 20 Furthermore, Richmond Square argued that it suffered a
front-end cost ($79,493.34) by having to pay the taxes on the Shep-
ard property in December of 1990.21
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and
held that there was no abuse of discretion on behalf of the trial
judge.22 In this malpractice action, the plaintiffs have the burden
of proving that the defendants were the "but for" cause of plaintiffs
damages incurred in paying the back taxes.23 Here the court held
that reasonable persons could conclude that Richmond Square suf-
fered damages when it incurred an unforeseen expense in paying
the back taxes, and that Mittleman was negligent in failing to dis-
cover these taxes before the closing date.24 The court further
pointed out that regardless of the loan's fate, Richmond Square
was forced to pay back-taxes to maintain its collateral for the loan
to Parking.25
Regarding mitigation, the court held that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion by refusing to admit the settlement docu-
ments.26 First, the settlement documents did not indicate that the
properties and other consideration covered the back taxes that
were owed. 27 Furthermore even if the documents were specific as
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 886.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 886-87.
25. Id. at 887.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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to the back taxes, they were inadmissible because the value of the
settlement would not have reduced the damages the plaintiffs in-
curred in paying back taxes.28 This was an expense that the plain-
tiffs had to pay regardless of the fate of the loan or any subsequent
settlement.29 Finally, the settlement documents did not contain
specific values of the properties, thus, introduction into evidence
would have caused the jury to speculate impermissibly.30
Overall, the trial judge could not have reduced the jury's
award because the evidence in the record did not specifically indi-
cate that the value of the settlement with Golden exceeded the
amount of the unpaid loan and covered or reduced the back-tax
payments. 31 Moreover, evidence of appraisals or other documents
concerning the settlement properties' value would be barred by the
collateral source doctrine. 32
CONCLUSION
The defendants' failure to discover and notify the plaintiffs of
the existence of back-taxes on the Shepard Building was legal mal-
practice and the proximate cause of the front-end expense incurred
by Richmond Square. There was no abuse of discretion in preclud-
ing the admission of the settlement documents that were specula-
tive and non-probative.
Camille A. McKenna
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 888.
32. Id. The collateral source doctrine "'mandates that evidence of payments
made to an injured party from sources independent of the tort-feasor are inadmis-
sible and shall not diminish the tort-feasor's liability to the plaintiff.'" Id. at 887
(quoting Gelsomino v. Mendonca, 723 A.2d 300, 301 (R.I. 1999)).
